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Abstract
In many developing countries, many households, especially in rural areas, are still heav-
ily reliant on solid biomass as a cooking fuel, despite its negative health and environmental
implications. Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is a clean alternative, but its higher cost implies
that its use is often limited to the richer, urban areas of a country. This paper focuses on the
Indian context and investigates, over a relatively long time-frame, whether social spillover
effects might have played a role in a household’s decision to use LPG, and how these effects
varied across different sub-populations. Using data from several waves of the National Sample
Survey (NSS), the recent ACCESS survey, and the India Human Development Survey (IHDS),
this paper provides multiple strands of evidence that, taken jointly, suggest that positive social
spillovers are present. Spillovers are also found to be stronger for households that belong to
social networks, than for households that do not belong to any network. Our results provide
partial evidence on convergence in LPG use rates across subgroups of the Indian population,
and have strong implications for policy-makers around the world who could leverage lessons
from social learning to encourage consumers to switch to cleaner sources of energy.
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1 Introduction
The use of solid biomass as a cooking fuel is still rampant in the developing world, and
is one of the main causes of indoor air pollution, and its deleterious health effects (World
Health Organization, 2018).1 Solid fuel use is still common in many parts of South Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. In India, for instance, even as recently as 2015, almost 59% of
the population (or about 780 million people) still used biomass for cooking (International
Energy Agency, 2017).
The adoption and sustained use of clean cooking fuels, and efficient cookstoves, re-
mains one of the primary means of mitigating the risks of indoor air pollution in countries
like India. Clean cooking alternatives, such as liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) have grown
in popularity over time, but, for several decades, rather slowly. Only very recently, an
acceleration in adoption has been observed, largely due to the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala
Yojana (PMUY) launched in 2016, according to which 80 million free connections of LPG
have been distributed to largely poor households in rural areas of India (Jain et al., 2018).
The literature abounds on the role of socioeconomic factors in determining which house-
holds use clean cooking fuels in developing countries (Lewis and Pattanayak 2012 provide
a thorough literature review). Income, education, and urbanization are found to be the
most common determinants of the choice to adopt clean cooking fuels, including in India,
along with access to cleaner cooking fuels (Reddy 1995, Rao and Reddy 2007, Kumar and
Viswanathan 2007, Farsi et al. 2007, Gupta and Kohlin 2006).
However, socioeconomic determinants need not be the only factor influencing house-
holds’ decisions to adopt clean fuels (or clean technologies more broadly). In this respect,
a growing literature has examined the role of social spillovers, or how the decisions of a
household’s neighbors, social network or friends may influence its own decisions, in the
context of energy-related consumption choices. The literature on developed economies
1 The risk of exposure is particularly high among women and children, who mostly stay indoors, and
spend considerable amounts of time near open fires.
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has looked at the role of spillovers in explaining the adoption of green technologies like
solar panels. Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) study the presence of peer effects in the
diffusion of solar panels in California, and find that an additional solar panel in a given
ZIP code is likely to increase the probability of adoption by households in the same ZIP
code by 0.78 %. Graziano and Gillingham (2015) also study the diffusion of photo-voltaic
panels in Connecticut, and find a similar pattern. Additional literature confirms the results
for solar panels, and provides new evidence for other green technologies, such as hybrid
cars (Carattini et al. 2017 provide a review).
A vast empirical literature also exists on the role of spillovers in new technology adop-
tion in developing countries, especially concerning agricultural and health innovations.
Broadly, this literature has found that households are more likely to be influenced by other
households, if they have strong information linkages with them (Conley and Udry, 2010)
and if social interactions offer opportunities to learn how to use a product, rather than
just influencing the desire to have it (Oster and Thornton, 2012). Households may also
delay their decision to adopt a given technology, if they aim to free ride on others adopt-
ing early and generating opportunities for learning (Bandiera and Rasul, 2006). In some
cases, households may also delay adoption indefinitely, if other people’s adoption create
positive externalities from which they could benefit. For instance, Kremer and Miguel
(2007) found that positive externalities across households resulted in slow diffusion of
de-worming drugs among many households during an experimental study conducted in
Kenya.
Our study contributes to the literature on the adoption (and use) of clean fuels in
developing countries by investigating the extent to which social spillovers may affect the
adoption of LPG in India. This paper is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to provide
an empirical estimate for social spillovers in this context, and we do so with a multi-
layered empirical design. By explicitly controlling for factors found to be important for
LPG adoption in the literature, and incorporating a rich set of socioeconomic and demo-
graphic controls, our paper provides multiple strands of evidence on why social spillovers
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may act as a possible determinant of a household’s decision to adopt LPG. Focus on the use
of LPG as a fuel, which is the economic outcome of interest, ensures that we look at the
continued use of clean cookstoves that burn LPG. As shown in a recent study by Hanna
et al. (2016), mere ownership of improved cookstoves does not necessarily imply that
households will reap their health benefits. Regular use (and maintenance) of cookstoves
is important to guarantee improved health outcomes (Duflo et al. 2008). This may be par-
ticularly relevant, as Mobarak et al. (2012), for instance, find from surveys in Bangladesh
that households’ willingness-to-pay for improved cookstoves is low, as households tend to
underestimate the risk of ill-health from burning solid biomass (cf. also Greenstone and
Jack 2015). This may lead to some households only using these stoves if they are provided
for free, and thus limiting their regular use.
While sources of fuel such as firewood are available freely, we provide evidence that
households can be influenced by other households residing in the same village or urban
block to purchase LPG, suggesting that spillovers may be effective not just in inducing
investment in technologies (such as cookstoves), but also their regular and continued use,
which is the ultimate goal to reduce indoor pollution. Hence, our findings contrast with
Beltramo et al. (2015), who implement a randomised control trial in Uganda to study the
role of spillovers in clean technologies but do not find any, because households desiring
the stoves lack the financial resources to purchase them. By analyzing the context of India
over several decades, we can analyze social spillovers in different phases of the market for
clean cookstoves and LPG, and at different levels of economic development. Importantly,
for both rural and urban areas, our paper covers periods in which the use of LPG was
rather non-normative, as well as more recent periods of relatively high adoption. Further-
more, we explore the mechanisms behind the observed social spillovers, by looking at the
role of social networks. We show that membership in specific types of social networks may
play an important role in determining the average LPG adoption rates in villages and in ur-
ban blocks. Specifically, we find that the level of LPG adoption is particularly high among
households that belong to certain groups or associations, such as women’s groups and
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developmental groups, in which flows of information (on LPG and its associated benefits)
are likely to be higher. Hence, our results may suggest that social networks play a criti-
cal role in dispersing information about LPG use and thus in encouraging households to
switch to clean energy sources. This result is consistent with the literature on technology
adoption in developing countries, which finds that close social interaction is more likely to
lead to stronger flows of information across households (Bandiera and Rasul 2006, Oster
and Thornton 2012, Munshi 2004).
To analyze social spillovers in the adoption of LPG over several decades, as well as in
the most recent periods, we use three large-scale surveys on household-level consumer
expenditure and energy access. Variation in the design of the surveys, including multiple
cross sections and panel data, also allow us to employ different empirical strategies to
shed light on the mechanisms behind the observed social spillovers. Furthermore, the
relatively large sample sizes allow us to compare the adoption of cooking fuels across all
areas of the country, and across very heterogeneous sets of households, both in terms of
socioeconomic characteristics, and regulatory context. The first dataset is drawn from the
National Sample Survey (NSS) on Household Consumer Expenditure, which comprises
repeated cross sections from 1983 up till 2011-2012. The source of the second dataset is
the very recent Access to Clean Cooking Energy and Electricity Survey of States (ACCESS),
which is a cross-sectional dataset of about 8000, relatively homogenous, rural households
from 2015. The final dataset is drawn from the India Human Development Survey (IHDS)
consumer expenditure survey, a two-year panel (2005-06 and 2011-12) with repeated
observations for about 40,000 households.
The LPG market is dynamic in India, and over the last decades has undergone a sig-
nificant transformation with changes in the economic and social context. Moreover, the
policy environment has also changed, with a spate of policies being implemented in more
recent years. These changes make the context of India particularly interesting, especially
given that most developing countries are still lagging behind in terms of LPG adoption.
For instance, more than 90 % of the population in many sub-Saharan African countries
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such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Mali still used solid fuel as the primary fuel
in 2013 (Van Leeuwen et al., 2017). To fully understand the role of social spillovers in
the process of adoption of LPG in India, data collected from a variety of sources, and
spanning a long time horizon, are thus necessary. The NSS data, for instance, is collected
on a large-scale sample of representative Indian households, and allows us to go back
in time to understand the evolution of spillovers. The ACCESS dataset is unique in that
it also collects information on supply of LPG, while its relatively homogenous sample al-
lows us to distill the effect of spillovers among rural households that have historically been
under-supplied with LPG. Using the IHDS data, we are able to incorporate household fixed
effects, which help us to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover,
the IHDS provides us with information about membership in social networks.
From an empirical perspective, our strategy in this paper is thus to provide multiple
pieces of evidence, which, when taken together, provide complementary evidence on the
presence of social spillovers in LPG use. We employ an instrumental variable linear prob-
ability model (IV-LPM) approach to study the determinants of a household’s decision to
use LPG as the primary cooking fuel, focusing mainly on the corresponding decision taken
by other households in the same village, or urban block, in order to control for known
sources of endogeneity. We leverage variation in the underlying data and use multiple
instruments to provide further robustness to our empirical strategy, implementing the
standard toolbox to test the validity of our instruments.
Our results are relevant to policy-makers operating in similar contexts and aiming at
reducing the use of polluting cooking fuels, with subsidies or other measures. Based on
our evidence, policy-makers may try to leverage existing social interactions, e.g. by target-
ing their interventions towards segments of society which are influential, and thus likely to
affect the behavior of other households, especially if the extent to which learning occurs
depends on the structure of the local social network (cf. Banerjee et al. 2014). In de-
veloped countries such as the United States, for instance, ‘solar ambassadors’ have been
introduced in the market for solar panels to try to spur the adoption of non-normative
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behaviors (Kraft-Todd et al., 2018). Leveraging social networks can lead to very cost-
effective interventions whenever people are influenced, in the adoption of a new technol-
ogy, by the number of people around them already using it (see Spencer et al. 2019 for a
technical assessment).
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 provides a background on cooking
fuel use in India, section 3 elaborates on the data used as well as the empirical approach,
section 4 presents the empirical results and discusses potential policy implications, and
section 5 concludes.
2 Background on Cooking Fuel Use and Social Structure
in India
The Indian context is particularly interesting to examine the adoption of LPG, especially
with a perspective spanning several decades. Several sources of energy are used as cook-
ing fuels in India, and the energy choices have historically varied between rural and urban
households. Rural households have tended to have strong preferences for bio-fuels such as
firewood, charcoal and agricultural waste, whereas many urban households have switched
to electricity, kerosene, and LPG. Fuels derived from solid biomass such as firewood are
not only cheaper (sometimes available for free) and more easily accessible, but they are
also difficult to wean households off. According to Census data, in 2011 almost 67 % of
the overall Indian population relied on solid fuels such as firewood, crop residue, dung
cakes and coal as the primary cooking fuel, and the proportion was almost 85 % among
rural households. This might have been due to affordability and easy availability, but also
due to cooking habits and preferences, which may change rather slowly over time. In
this paper, we choose to restrict our attention to the use of LPG as the clean cooking fuel
alternative. This is because it is the most widely available clean cooking fuel in India, and
the most affordable.
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The energy transition has been more sustained in the urban sector than in the rural:
in 1987, for instance, consumption of traditional biomass and LPG was not significantly
different among rural and urban households, whereas in 2010, 60 % of urban households
used LPG, without simultaneously using biomass-based fuels, while only 10 % of rural
households did so (Cheng and Urpelainen, 2014). Rural households are often unable to
afford the recurrent expenditures needed to acquire the cylinders, and also have diffi-
culties in purchasing cookstoves. LPG users are also required to have a permanent and
verifiable residential address, which limits the access of poor or homeless people, or even
migrant workers in urban areas (Gupta and Kohlin, 2006), although in recent years the
government has relaxed this requirement for smaller LPG cylinders at least in some areas
(Press Information Bureau, 2014). LPG is marketed by state-owned petroleum distribu-
tion companies, and its price is fixed by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. The
government has subsidized LPG (and kerosene) since the late 1960s, although in recent
times efforts are being made to phase these subsidies out.
Nevertheless, while it seems that LPG is subsidized to meet the requirements of poor
households, the benefits of these subsidies have largely accrued to the richer urban house-
holds. According to recent estimates, the top 20 % of the population, by consumption
expenditure, received 60 % of the total direct subsidy, whereas the bottom 50 % of the
population received about 8 % of the subsidy (International Institute for Sustainable De-
velopment, 2014). There are also disparities in the distribution of subsidies and LPG
connections across Indian states. For instance, five states (Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh,
Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka) account for around 50 % of the total connec-
tions of LPG. The same five states, for instance, receive almost 50 % of the subsidies,
and, even within these states, the urban areas benefit the most (International Institute for
Sustainable Development, 2014).
Acquiring an LPG connection requires a fixed cost to purchase the stove, and install the
equipment. Households purchase gas cylinders as and when required. Income and aware-
ness are thus obvious determinants of the choice of a household to consume cleaner fuels
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such as LPG. However, the shift to cleaner fuels may not necessarily follow the energy-
ladder model, according to which households switch to cleaner cooking fuels in a linear
way as the level of income increases. In this respect, we note that fuel-stacking is still
commonly observed among many Indian households, where a mixture of modern and
traditional fuels are used simultaneously (Cheng and Urpelainen, 2014).
While access to LPG has improved over time, especially in rural areas, data drawn
from a very recent study suggests that for a sub-sample of rural households belonging to
some of the poorest states of the country, almost 58 % out of 8,566 households stated that
LPG availability was a challenge for them (Jain et al., 2018). Data drawn from this study
also suggest that almost 84 % of the households covered by the study continued to use
firewood, suggesting that transitioning to clean fuels remains challenging in rural areas of
India. Moreover, among both urban and rural households, the policy emphasis has shifted
to usage; ensuring that households not only acquire connections, but also use them on a
regular basis, has become a priority. Accordingly, our study focuses on the role of social
spillovers on the decision to use LPG as a primary fuel.
In the last decade, reforms have been undertaken by governments to improve the ac-
cessibility of LPG to Indian consumers, both rural and urban, and to try to improve the
provision of subsidies. However, either these reforms have often been punctuated with
policy reversals, or they have not had a considerable impact on improving the actual dis-
bursement of subsidies. For instance, in September 2012, the central government capped
the number of subsidized cylinders that a household can acquire at six per year. In Jan-
uary 2013, however, the limit was increased to nine cylinders per household per annum,
which was further increased to 12 by 2014. Successive governments have found it politi-
cally infeasible to initiate a phase-out of the subsidies, even though efforts are being made
to allocate more resources towards poorer, rural households.
For instance, in March 2015, the central government initiated a policy encouraging
rich, urban consumers of LPG to voluntarily renounce their subsidies, which would free
up resources for targeting subsidies to poor households. Following this announcement,
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almost two million households surrendered their rights to receive subsidies on LPG cylin-
ders. Such measures have had some success in ameliorating the disparities that currently
exist in securing access to LPG for all households in India. In the same vein, and as high-
lighted in the previous section, the Indian government launched the PMUY initiative in
the following year, aimed at distributing free connections to rural households living below
the poverty line (Jain et al., 2018).
In the Indian context, social networks and groups also play a crucial role in deter-
mining people’s behavior in many facets of life. While the evidence on the relationship
between social networks and the adoption of LPG is scarce, a gap that we contribute to fill
with this paper, there is abundant literature on the role of social networks in the adoption
of other types of behavior and technologies in India. We shortly describe here relevant
literature related to the following social networks, which leads to them being considered
in surveys and in this paper: agricultural cooperatives, business associations, develop-
ment groups/non-governmental organizations (NGOs), credit and saving organizations,
women’s groups, religious and social groups, and caste associations.
Agricultural cooperatives in India have often been shown to help achieve efficient pro-
duction scales, and solve market failures arising from indivisibilities and collective action
problems. For instance, evidence from Maharashtra suggests that local elites that assem-
bled themselves into cooperatives and bought sugarcane grown by several small-scale
producers actually protected the latter against exploitation, while allowing for efficient
management of the sugarcane mills (Thorp et al. 2005, Attwood and Baviskar 1988).
Business associations are also linked to higher efficiency, for instance by providing en-
forcement of property rights when formal institutions are lacking, allowing entrepreneurs
to engage in profitable activities in under-developed regions (Fisman and Khanna, 2004).
Membership in credit and saving organizations, such as microfinance groups, has been
shown to contribute to economic development in a wide range of contexts, including
India. For instance, Feigenberg et al. (2013) show with a randomized controlled trial re-
alized in West Bengal that (randomly) assigning individuals to “repayment groups” leads
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to more interactions and a higher willingness to pool risk, and a much lower likelihood of
default.
Women’s groups are shown, in a recent program evaluation study in Andhra Pradesh
(Deininger and Liu, 2013), to lead to a positive impact on consumption, nutritional intake,
as well as asset accumulation. Development groups are shown, among other outcomes, to
increase immunization uptake, by spreading information about the benefits of vaccination
and by creating social pressure leading more families to have their children fully immu-
nized (e.g. Vikram et al. 2012 in the medical literature). Religious groups are known to
affect many aspects of life in India, including the consumption decisions with respect to
food (Filippini and Srinivasan, 2018). Caste associations can also be very influential, in
several ways. One of them is explored in Barnhardt et al. (2017), who study the effect
of a lottery providing improved housing on the quality of life of slum households. While
the lottery improved housing conditions, it did not improve other outcomes, and also led
to social isolation, because of the caste structure. The authors find that to avoid isola-
tion, most winners ended up renouncing their wins. These are just a few examples on
how social networks have played a crucial role in determining several types of economic
outcomes in the Indian context, including health outcomes.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
In this section, we describe the data and methodology used to test our main hypotheses
about the presence of social spillovers in the adoption of LPG by Indian households.
In this paper, we adopt both a historical perspective, examining the adoption of LPG
over several decades, and a more contemporaneous perspective, using the most recent
available data. We also analyze mechanisms, focusing in particular on social networks.
Overall, the objective of the approach adopted in this paper is to provide multiple strands
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of evidence on the role of social spillovers in incentivising Indian consumers to adopt LPG.
Specifically, we use three sets of data for the empirical analysis. The first dataset that
we employ is that of the National Sample Survey (NSS) of India, which is published by the
National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO), a subdivision of the Ministry of Statistics
and Program Implementation of the Indian government (National Sample Survey Office,
2019). The NSSO has been conducting consumer expenditure surveys (CES) on an annual
basis (barring some years) since 1983, thereby providing repeated cross sections. Each
sample frame is designed to be representative, and comprises households in both the rural
and urban areas of the country. The surveys include detailed expenditure data on food
items, clothing and footwear, durables, medical and educational expenditure, and other
items of daily use such as cooking and lighting fuel.
The NSSO conducts "thick" rounds of the NSS at a frequency of approximately every
five years, whereas in the interim, "thin" rounds are conducted, wherein a smaller sample
of households is surveyed. The thick rounds that are included in our analysis are the 43rd,
55th, 61st and 66th rounds of the surveys (corresponding to the years 1987-88, 1999-00,
2004-05 and 2009-10).
In the empirical estimations, we only use the thick rounds of NSS data to ensure that
the sample size is sufficiently large to provide ample geographical heterogeneity in the
data, as well as go far back in time to allow for a sufficient historical perspective. The
NSS data allow us to attribute to each household the district and the state of residence.
In addition, the data provide us with coded information for the urban block or village to
which each household belongs. Based on this information, we are able to ascertain which
households reside in the same village or urban block, without having to know the exact
location of their residence (which is undisclosed due to data privacy concerns).
The second database is the Access to Clean Cooking Energy and Electricity Survey of
States (ACCESS), conducted recently by the Council on Energy, Environment and Water
in collaboration with Columbia University (Aklin et al., 2016). This is one of the largest
surveys on energy access conducted in India, covering more than 8,500 households in six
12
states (Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal). It is
one of the first surveys to provide extensive information on the affordability, availability,
duration of use, as well as levels of satisfaction with LPG use in general. Additionally,
and in contrast to the NSS, this sample entirely comprises relatively homogenous rural
households, thus adding an additional interesting layer to our analysis. This dataset cov-
ers 2015, thus providing a very recent perspective on the adoption of LPG among rural
households in India.2
The third database is from the India Human Development Survey (IHDS), compiled by
the University of Maryland and the National Council of Applied Economic Research (Desai
and Vanneman 2005, Desai and Vanneman 2011). It is a panel dataset, with two rounds
of data available, covering 2005-06 and 2011-12. 83 % of the households sampled in
the first round also responded in the second round. The panel nature of the data enables
us to track changes in LPG adoption over time. This dataset, composed of about 40,000
households, thus complements the larger cross sections of the NSS, and the recent cross
section from ACCESS, while allowing us to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
In the NSS and IHDS data, households are asked detailed questions about their ex-
penditure on items over a "reference period", which is defined by the questionnaire for
each item. The reference period often varies across items. For instance, for fuel-related
expenditures, in most rounds households are asked for expenditure over the previous 30
days.3
The NSS and IHDS contain information on the demographic characteristics of all in-
dividuals of a household, including the age, gender, and level of education, whereas the
2 A second round has been conducted in 2018, but the data are not yet ready to be made available to
researchers.
3 The 66th round of the NSS comprises two sub-rounds of surveys, which differ in terms of the recall
period for some of the items purchased; this was done by the NSS to investigate whether there is a
tendency for households to underreport expenditures with a longer recall period. For instance, the
first type of data in the 66th round uses a recall period of 30 days for food, beverages, and tobacco
expenditures, while the second type of data uses a recall period of 7 days for expenditures on the same
items. To ensure comparability with the other rounds, we only use observations for which the 30-day
window was used.
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ACCESS database contains information aggregated to the household level. Information is
also provided on land ownership (total land possessed, whether land is rented, irrigated,
etc.), the physical characteristics of the house (such as the type of structure, the condition
of the house, type of floor, etc.), prices of fuels such as LPG and kerosene, ownership of
durables (such as cookstoves) as well as access to electricity.4,5
The measure of household-level LPG adoption, and our dependent variable, for the
models using NSS data is a binary variable for whether LPG is the primary cooking fuel
of a household or not. This information is particularly useful, given that, as mentioned,
fuel stacking is commonly observed among households in India, where multiple fuels are
used at the same time. For the IHDS and ACCESS datasets, our measure of LPG use is
represented by whether the household spent on LPG in the last 30 days, and whether the
household uses LPG for cooking purposes, respectively. In the IHDS data, we restrict the
sample to the households for whom we have valid information on whether or not they
spent on LPG in the last 30 days, and among those that spent on LPG, those that primarily
use the fuel for cooking purposes (instead of heating, or other purposes). This eschews
the possibility of irregular use of LPG, which is important given our emphasis on regular
LPG use, rather than on mere LPG adoption, in line with the findings of Hanna et al.
(2016) and the current policy agenda in India.
Table 1 provides information on the mean, maximum, and minimum number of house-
holds by village or urban block across our datasets, and the mean LPG adoption rate (at
4 While electricity is not required for using a cookstove with an LPG cylinder, this variable is used as a
proxy for economic development, which could in turn enable access to LPG. The urban centers that are
chosen are the state capitals, and the tier-I and tier-II cities of the country (where a tier-I city is defined
as a city with population above 4 million, while a tier-II city is defined as one with population between
1 and 4 million).
5 The NSS data do not directly provide a variable for the price paid by consumers to purchase LPG.
We derive it by dividing a household’s expenditure on LPG by the quantity of LPG purchased by the
household. However, this can only be observed for households that actually purchased LPG in the last
30 days, which may be a small fraction of households for several su-bsamples. In order to estimate this
variable for other households, we follow the procedure outlined by Kumar and Viswanathan (2007),
compute the average price in the district, and attribute this as a measure of price for the households for
which this information is not available.
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Table 1: Sample Size and LPG Adoption Rate by Village/Urban Block
Data source NSS IHDS ACCESS
Round 43 55 61 66 (Type 1) Overall Overall
Year 1987-88 1999-00 2004-05 2009-10 2005-06 and 2011-12 2015
Households sampled in village/urban block Mean 9.95 11.96 9.98 7.98 33.88 12
Households sampled in village/urban block: Min. 2 2 3 2 4 11
Households sampled in village/urban block: Max. 10 12 10 8 88 12
LPG adoption rate at village/urban block level: Mean (%) 10.5 25.82 29.79 41.24 65.57 21.6
Observations 104874 103094 97998 67374 43179 8563
Notes: Values reported are calculated only for observations included in the regression sample.
the village/urban block level). We observe that while at the overall level, adoption rates
of LPG have increased over time (across the rounds of the NSS as well as the IHDS), they
are still relatively low in the rural areas covered by the 2015 ACCESS dataset. While the
sample size per village or urban block varies across datasets, it is fixed at around 10 in
case of the 43rd, 55th, and 61st rounds of the NSS, 8 in the 66th, and at 12 in the case of the
ACCESS data. Thus, there is meaningful variation in sample size per village/urban block
only in the IHDS data. In our empirical analyses, we leverage the fact of having access to
multiple datasets, and use the IHDS data to run sensitivity tests by restricting the sample
to only villages and urban blocks having a certain minimum number of households above
varying thresholds.
Figure A1 in Appendix A provides a historical perspective on the distribution of house-
holds by primary fuel-type (for cooking purposes) in the four thick rounds of the NSS. As
is clear from these graphs, firewood was in the 1980s, and still is to a large extent in the
most recent round, the primary cooking fuel for a majority of the households. The popu-
larity of LPG has increased over this period, and in 2010 it was the second most popular
cooking fuel used by households. Kerosene has also gained in popularity in recent years,
primarily in urban areas. Dung cakes have gained popularity in rural areas.
Figures A2 and A3 focus on LPG and plot the evolution of the proportion of house-
holds for whom LPG was the main cooking fuel, and show how it has gained popularity,
especially in the 2000s. We also observe that during the period covered by the NSS data,
the pace of increase in adoption has been much faster in urban areas, thus leading to a
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much larger share of LPG users in urban areas than in rural areas.
Figure A4 shows the regions which have contributed most to the increase in adoption
of LPG. In 1987, the highest proportion of LPG users were in Delhi and the "union ter-
ritories" of Goa, Chandigarh, and Daman and Diu, which are all primarily urban areas.
Over time, some of the bigger (and richer) states, such as Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and
Karnataka, experienced an increase in the share of LPG adopters.
Tables 2 and 3 provide summary statistics on some of the demographic characteristics
of the households using NSS data, and the ACCESS and IHDS data, respectively. From
Table 2, it is clear that the proportion of households using LPG as the primary cooking
fuel has been increasing over time (from 10 % in 1987-88 to 39 % in 2009-10). Simulta-
neously, the proportion of households that have access to firewood has declined over the
same period from 73 % to 63 %. Another interesting finding to emerge from this table
is the drop in the percentage of households that bought a new cookstove in the last 365
days: it declines from around 4 % in 1987-88 to just about 1 % in 2009-10. This may
be attributed to the S-shaped nature of the diffusion process: with time, more households
would have already bought cookstoves, thus the proportion of households that buy new
cookstoves can be expected to decline. We find from Table 3 that levels of education,
household income, and electricity are lower for respondents in the ACCESS dataset. This
is primarily because this sample comprises only rural households. Moreover, and consis-
tently with the previous observation, the household size on average is larger, and fewer
households have access to electricity.
The statistics presented in Table 3 suggest much higher rates of adoption of LPG com-
pared to those in Table 2: the differences between the NSS data and the IHDS data can
be attributed to the difference in the measure of adoption. In Table 3, we are consider-
ing whether a household spent on LPG, and not necessarily whether they used it as the
primary cooking fuel, which is the reason for the difference in values in these two ta-
bles. Households have been found to often spend on LPG, without using it as the primary












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Summary Statistics of IHDS (2005-06 and 2011-12) and ACCESS (2015) Data
Year IHDS 2005-06 IHDS 2011-12 ACCESS 2015
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs
Whether HH spent on LPG in the last 30 days (%) 59.5 49.1 22703 99.8 3.41 22781 21.61 41.16 8566
Whether HH has access to electricity (%) 95.9 19.8 20717 99.99 0.01 22781 65.86 47.42 8563
Proportion of rural population (%) 60.6 48.9 22703 58 49.4 22781 100 0 0
HH size 5.79 2.95 22703 4.83 2.29 22781 6.74 3.53 8563
Number of years of education for HH head (IHDS)/ Level of education of HH head (ACCESS) 8.72 4.9 22673 9.40 4.97 22772 1.30 1.22 8563
HH income (Rs./year, IHDS)/ HH consumption expenditure (Rs./year, ACCESS) 67506.37 97836.31 22703 155057.3 261935.1 22781 63619 46816 8563
Notes: Levels of education in the ACCESS dataset are defined as 1: no formal schooling, 2: up to 5th grade, 3: up to 10th grade, 4: 12th grade or high school diploma, 5: graduate or above. Income is
measured on a monthly basis in the ACCESS dataset, statistics above have been scaled up by a factor of 12 to calculate the annual income.
Table 4: LPG Adoption Rates by Social Network (IHDS)
Type of groups LPG Adoption Rates
Subsample Overall Rural Urban
Rate Obs. Rate Obs. Rate Obs.
Women’s groups 0.826 4,172 0.759 2,767 0.957 1,405
Youth and sports associations 0.837 2,160 0.721 1,102 0.957 1,058
Unions and business groups 0.897 2,718 0.808 968 0.947 1,750
Credit and savings associations 0.822 4,426 0.744 2,871 0.964 1,555
Religious and social groups 0.764 6,789 0.656 4,103 0.931 2,686
Caste associations 0.718 4,720 0.608 2,994 0.909 1,726
Developmental groups and NGOs 0.968 2,673 0.948 1,577 0.997 1,096
Agricultural groups and cooperatives 0.638 1,331 0.545 1,018 0.939 313
Notes: Average LPG adoption rates per group are based on both periods in our panel.
Finally, Table 4 provides descriptive statistics, in terms of overall adoption and adop-
tion by rural and urban households, respectively, for each social network considered in our
paper. Based on the classifications available in the data, we consider the following social
networks: women’s groups, youth and sports associations, unions and business groups,
credit and savings associations, religious and social groups, caste associations, develop-
mental groups and NGOs, and agricultural cooperatives. These social networks have been
found to be important in influencing household consumption expenditure in the socio-
logical literature (Vanneman et al. 2006, Arun et al. 2016), as well as in the economic
literature (as highlighted in the previous section). As indicated by Table 4, there is a fair
amount of variation in LPG adoption among groups, especially in the rural context.
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3.2 Methodology
In this paper, our main objective is to understand whether social spillovers have been
relevant in facilitating the adoption of LPG among Indian households. To this effect,
we adopt a multi-pronged approach by providing evidence from both cross-sectional and
panel datasets on the existence of these spillovers. In this section, we shortly distill our
main hypotheses and describe the empirical methodology that we adopt to test them.
Our first hypothesis on the role of (positive) social spillovers in the adoption of LPG in
India implies that we should observe higher adoption of LPG in areas wherein adoption
is already relatively high. In this respect, we refer to the recent and abovementioned
empirical literature on the role of spillovers in new technology adoption, especially those
related to agricultural and health innovations in developing economies (Conley and Udry
2010, Bandiera and Rasul 2006, Kremer and Miguel 2007, Oster and Thornton 2012)
but also to green technologies in developed countries (Bollinger and Gillingham 2012,
Graziano and Gillingham 2015, Baranzini et al. 2017).
Our second hypothesis posits that close social interactions (proxied for instance by
participation in social networks) are more likely to lead to stronger flows of information
across households. As noted in the previous section, in the Indian context, social networks
and groups play an important role in the organization of society. Many other developing
countries have similar social structures, which have been found to influence the flows
of information across households (Bandiera and Rasul 2006, Masera et al. 2000, Oster
and Thornton 2012). We expect that certain social networks are likely to have strong
spillover effects with respect to LPG adoption, especially those where flows of information
related to LPG are more likely to be stronger, such as women’s groups, or developmen-
tal groups/NGOs, whereas we expect other networks to have weaker spillovers related to
LPG use, such as youth or sports groups, or credit and savings organizations. By look-
ing at social networks, we also link to a broader literature examining the role of social
capital and membership in social organizations on important outcome variables such as
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prosperity and economic development (e.g. Putnam et al. 1994, Knack and Keefer 1997).
We start with our first hypothesis. To determine whether spillovers have been prevalent
in LPG adoption, we would need to estimate a model of the following form:
Ai = α0 + α1A−ij + α2Xi + µi (1)
where the dependent variable is denoted by Ai, a binary variable indicating whether
LPG is the primary cooking fuel of household i (or whether the household spent on LPG
in the last 30 days, for the estimations using IHDS data), and the main independent vari-
able is A−ij, the average LPG adoption rate among all households (other than household
i) in village/urban block j. Xi denotes household-specific controls (such as household
size, age, gender and the level of education of the head of the household, whether the
household has access to electricity, etc.) µi denotes the stochastic error term. Standard
errors are clustered at the village/urban block level, in order to control for the possibility
of errors being correlated across geographical units. Model (1) takes this form for the
estimations that use cross-sectional data. In the case of the models estimated using the
IHDS data, all variables described in the previous paragraph have a "t" subscript denoting
the relevant time period. Moreover, we use household and year fixed effects to control for
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
A "naive" regression will not suffice to estimate the effect of social spillovers in the
adoption of LPG in India. There are several reasons why there may be potential threats to
identification with the estimation of a simple linear probability model due to endogene-
ity, in particular in relation to the problem of "reflection" or "simultaneity" (Manski 1993,
Manski 2000, Moffitt 2001). When studying peers, it may indeed be hard to isolate the
effect of agent i on agent j, independent of the effect of agent j on agent i. Endogene-
ity may also arise from "homophily” (a form of geographical sorting according to which
households with similar preferences cluster together), and common unobservable factors
affecting both left and right-hand side variables.
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In consistency with the existing literature, we address the issue of endogeneity as
follows; first, we take advantage of the very rich data available and make use of a large set
of controls in all of our specifications. Second, we systematically combine analyses using
both cross-sectional and panel data. In the latter, household-specific fixed effects allow us
to capture unobserved heterogeneity across households. Third, and most importantly, we
use an instrumental variable (IV) linear probability model (LPM) approach.6
We use two different sets of instrumental variables. Recall that three different datasets
are used in this study, which implies that our instrumental variable approach needs to be
adapted to the available data. Both sets of instrumental variables provide us with strong
first stages and pass the standard overidentification tests in all specifications used in this
study.
Our first set of instrumental variables (for the endogenous variable capturing average
LPG adoption at the village or urban-block level) is the proportion of the sample from each
village (or urban block) belonging to the highest monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE)
deciles. MPCE is found to be an important determinant of the choice of a household to
adopt LPG, thus the average LPG adoption rate in the village or urban block is likely to
be highly correlated with the proportion of the population that belongs to the highest
MPCE decile. The exogeneity restriction works in a very similar way to the study by
Duflo and Saez (2002), which was in turn based on the estimation strategy developed by
Case and Katz (1991). Duflo and Saez (2002) study whether there are peer effects among
colleagues in the same department of a university in participation in retirement plans, and
find that both the choice of employees to enroll in these plans, and the choice of vendor,
were influenced by the decisions made by colleagues (belonging to the same department).
To causally assess the existence of peer effects, the authors instrument average par-
6 We opt for IV-LPM over IV-Probit to ensure that our standard errors are correctly measured in all spec-
ifications. Given the incidental parameter problem that non-linear models such as the Probit model
face when using household-specific fixed effects, our IV-LPM methodology also allows for immediate
interpretation and ensures consistency across models. Qualitatively, the results obtained using IV-Probit
are the same as those presented in this paper. All additional tables are available by the authors upon
request.
21
ticipation in each peer group by the salary or tenure structure of that group, while con-
trolling for individual wages or tenure. The underlying assumption is that once wage and
tenure are controlled for in the second-stage model, the average wage or tenure in the
department is unlikely to directly affect individual enrollment decisions. Similarly, the
underlying assumption in our context is that once we control, in the second stage, for
factors such as income, education, access to electricity and to LPG, the proportion of the
population belonging to the highest income deciles is unlikely to directly affect a house-
hold’s decision to use LPG. The underlying assumption in Duflo and Saez (2002) would
not hold if employees were to choose to work for particular departments because of the
choice of retirement plans, which is however, highly unlikely. In their study, departments
are very similar in many dimensions, especially in terms of salary and years of service of
employees, while the participation rates in the retirement plan differ significantly across
libraries. In our context, after controlling for factors determining preferences and access
to LPG, it is also unlikely that a household’s decision to locate (and live) in a village/urban
block depends on the proportion of population belonging to the higher income deciles in
that village that use LPG.
The second set of instrumental variables that we use are the share of households in the
village/urban block in our sample that have highly educated women (at least a university
degree), as well as the average size of land holdings at the village/urban block level. The
rationale for using the share of households with highly educated women in our second
set of instruments is as follows: first, the use of proportions as instruments follows from
Duflo and Saez (2002), as with the first set of instruments. Second, we leverage the fact
that highly educated women may be more inclined to learn about the benefits of LPG
and more sensitive to the health and environmental effects of dirtier fuels. Furthermore,
highly educated women have a higher opportunity cost of time, which is also expected
to direct them towards investing in (relatively more efficient) LPG cookstoves, and using
them on a regular basis, as opposed to using biomass (Muller and Yan 2018, Farsi et al.
2007). Unsurprisingly, in our datasets highly educated women tend to be disproportion-
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ately present in urban households. This is not an issue per se, as our analyses are at
the village/urban block level and include a large set of control variables controlling for
potential confounders.
In a conservative vein, however, we combine this instrument with another one, which
may be more relevant for rural areas, namely the average size of possessed land hold-
ings at the village/urban block level, which is measured in acres. Villages with larger
amounts of land possessed per household comprise relatively wealthier households, as
land is an important asset or source of wealth for agricultural households. In the spirit
of our approach relying on income deciles, we expect higher incomes to be associated
with a higher likelihood of adopting LPG in the first stage. In 2005, the Indian govern-
ment initiated the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana (RGGVY) program, which
was, essentially, a program that aimed to provide all villages without electricity a con-
nection within five years. The RGGVY program was successful in the context of village
electrification: rates of electrification increased from 74 % in 2005 to 91 % in 2011. How-
ever, more than two-thirds of the increase in connections to electricity supply went to rich
households, and to villages that were richer. Khandker et al. (2014) show that wealthier
rural households (and those that owned more land) benefited more from electrification,
and households that were electrified in fact spent less time collecting firewood and other
forms of biomass, and more time on productive labor and (and in acquiring education, in
the case of children). In our model, we control for access to electricity, income, and land
ownership in the second-stage. The underlying assumption in our model is that, once we
control for the abovementioned factors, larger average land holdings are unlikely to affect
a household’s behavior directly, and only indirectly through other people’s adoption, and
thus through social spillovers.7
7 Another possible choice of instrument in our panel data setting might have been to instrument adoption
in the second wave of 2011 with adoption in the previous period, thus collapsing the data to a cross-
sectional dimension. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. Given the gap
of six years between both rounds, such instrument could not be used in our context because of the weak
first stage (Cragg-Donald F-statistics below 2). Such an instrument could, however, be used in future
research, using for instance multiple waves of the ACCESS data.
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These are likely to be valid sets of instruments only if they do not directly affect house-
holds’ LPG adoption rates. One way for this concern to be realized is through access
to LPG or to dirtier fuels. Households may be able to use LPG, because they live in a
neighborhood that is richer, and thus has better supply of LPG. Furthermore, unobserved
characteristics linked to the adoption decision could also be correlated with average in-
come at the village/urban block level, which could then have a direct effect on households’
LPG adoption rates. For instance, factors like tastes and preferences for cooking methods
(and/or food) could be correlated to both. In our empirical approach, we first estimate
model (1) using each of the four thick rounds of the NSS data and the proportion of pop-
ulation in the highest MPCE deciles as instruments, while controlling for income in the
second-stage estimation, exactly in line with the estimation methodology of Duflo and
Saez (2002). Along with many other covariates, we use controls for religion and caste to
capture preferences for cooking methods or food. We then repeat this with the ACCESS
dataset, using both sets of instruments, and additionally controlling for supply of/access
to LPG. In order to alleviate residual concerns with identification, we then exploit the
potential of the IHDS panel data to estimate a fixed-effects instrumental variable linear
probability model, while using the second set of instruments. The choice of the set of
instruments is mainly driven by the variables available in each dataset.
To test our second hypothesis, we use the abovementioned approach with an additional
component from the IHDS data, which provides information on the social networks and
groups to which households declare to belong. In this way, we are able to offer insights on
how stronger social ties are linked to spillover effects in consumption decisions. For these
estimations, our endogenous variable is defined as the average LPG adoption among all
households that reside in the same village or urban block (except household i), and belong
to one of the eight different networks that we consider in this paper. In this case, we do
not instrument for belonging to one of the networks. While theoretically it is possible
that people who use LPG join a given network, we consider it as rather implausible in the
social environment that we study. Most of the networks that we consider are not new in
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This section presents the results of the empirical estimations. We proceed as follows.
First, we use NSS data to test our first hypothesis on social spillovers in the adoption
of LPG with multiple waves of cross-sectional data covering multiple decades, which is
key for obtaining a historical perspective. Second, we switch to the most recent dataset,
obtained from ACCESS, and zoom in on the situation of rural households, testing the very
same hypothesis with both sets of instruments. Third, we move to a panel setting, using
the IHDS data, and test the robustness of our findings concerning the first hypothesis by
incorporating household-specific fixed effects. Fourth, we leverage the full potential of
the IHDS data and analyze the role of social networks and social groups in affecting social
spillovers in the adoption of LPG, thus formally testing our second hypothesis.
The results from the NSS are presented in Table 5.8 Our independent variable of
interest is the average level of LPG adoption at the urban block or village level. We find
evidence to support the existence of social spillovers from the data of the 43rd, 55th as
well as the 61st rounds of the NSS (at the 1 % level for the 43rd and 55th, and 5 % level
for the 61st round). The coefficients should be interpreted as follows: in the 43rd round,
a one unit increase in the average village/urban-block LPG adoption rate increases the
probability that household i adopts LPG by about 0.825 units. In other words, if the
share of households in a village using LPG increases from 0 to 100 %, the probability
of household i adopting LPG increases by 83 percentage points. The magnitude of the
8 Table 5 displays only the second stage of our IV-LPM approach. Estimates from the first stage are
presented in Table B2. A standard comparison between the IV-LPM approach and a naive regression
model would rely on Table B1 in the Appendix, showing estimates for the simple LPM.
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main coefficients of interest in Table 5 points to decreasing social spillovers over time,
which is consistent with a market reaching maturity. The coefficient in the last wave is,
actually, very close to zero and statistically non-significant. Note that this coefficient is
mainly driven by urban households. In Table 8, which we discuss in the following section,
we show that social spillovers in rural areas remain positive even in 2009-2010, which is
consistent with what we find later in this section using the ACCESS data. We would obtain
the same pattern with the IHDS data. This observation further confirms the intuition that
rural areas lagged behind urban areas in the process of reaching market saturation.
We now shortly present an overview of the results with regards to the control variables.
We find that households with better access to electricity are more likely to adopt LPG. We
also find that households having heads that are older, female, or more educated are more
likely to use LPG as the primary cooking fuel. On the other hand, those facing a high price
of LPG, or those with access to firewood, are less likely to use LPG. Our results suggest
that larger households are more likely to adopt LPG, a common yet not undisputed finding
(Lewis and Pattanayak 2012 offer a discussion).
The first-stage results of Table B2 suggest that the larger the population share in the
village/urban block belonging to the higher income deciles, the higher is the average rate
of LPG adoption. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients of household-level attributes on
average LPG adoption are in line with economic intuition, and generally consistent with
the coefficients in the second stage. Further, the first-stage estimation yields consistently
high Cragg-Donald F-statistics, and satisfies the overidentification tests.
Estimation results from the NSS data provide the first set of evidence on the presence
of social spillovers in the historical development of the market for LPG. We now turn to
the ACCESS data. Table 6 presents the estimation results using the ACCESS data.9
Odd columns (1 and 3) include the results of the estimation of the model using pro-
portion of households belonging to the highest income deciles as instruments, whereas
9 The first-stage results of these estimations are provided in Table B3 in the Appendix.
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Table 5: NSS Estimation Results: Second Stage
Round 43 55 61 66
Year 1987-88 1999-00 2004-05 2009-10
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
Average LPG use rate (village/urban block) 0.825*** 0.315*** 0.084** -0.070
(0.024) (0.025) (0.036) (0.047)
Whether bordering an urban center? -0.027** -0.005* -0.072** 0.011
(0.012) (0.003) (0.035) (0.057)
Whether HH had access to electricity? 0.032*** 0.055*** 0.045*** 0.058***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Whether HH lives in a rural area? 0.039*** -0.051*** -0.088*** -0.125***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.015)
Whether HH purchased a cookstove in last 30/365 days? -0.032*** -0.104*** -0.020 0.021
(0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.020)
HH size 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.019***
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001)
Age of head of HH 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Whether head of HH is female? 0.004* 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Whether head of HH is educated? 0.035*** 0.096*** 0.090*** 0.113***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Price of LPG (0.00004) -0.007*** -0.0004** -0.005***
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.001)
Price of kerosene 0.005*** 0.000005 -0.00001* 0.002
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.002)
Whether HH had access to firewood? -0.115*** -0.233*** -0.431*** -0.507***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
Observations 104845 102994 97963 67374
R-squared 0.5183 0.6727 0.7106 0.7666
First-stage Cragg Donald F-Stat 1756.389 1399.271 923.55 309.779
Hansen J-Statistic 4.779 4.435 12.38 3.016
P-value 0.19 0.22 0.01 0.39
Notes: The proportion of population in the same village or urban block in the four highest income deciles are used
as instruments. The Cragg-Donald F-statistics are consistently high, and surpass the rule-of-thumb bound of 10
proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005) to identify weak instruments (first-stage results are provided in Table B2 in
the Appendix). All specifications include dummies for MPCEs, and for belonging to districts, religion, and castes.
Standard errors are clustered at the village/urban block level (reported in parentheses). ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively
denote significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels. The coefficient of the constant has not been reported. The
variable "Whether HH purchased a cookstove in last 30/365 days" includes by design expenditure on repairs in the
55th round.
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even columns (2 and 4) present the results of the estimation using proportion of house-
holds having highly educated women, as well as the average size of the landholdings in
the village/urban block, as instruments. In columns 1 and 2, we include as a control a
dummy variable for whether the household did not have access to LPG (namely, if they
had to travel too far, or if it was unavailable) and use the entire sample for estimation
purposes. In columns 3 and 4, we restrict the sample to only those households that had
access to LPG and re-estimate the models using both sets of instruments.
We find that the coefficient on the variable measuring village level adoption rate of
LPG is positive, and significant at the 1 % level using both sets of instruments. In fact, we
find that the coefficients in columns 3 and 4 are larger in magnitude than those in columns
1 and 2 respectively, and that they are persistently positive and significant, highlighting
that social spillovers might have been prominent in determining household LPG consump-
tion decisions, even after accounting for its availability among households. Moreover, the
coefficients are larger when we use education and land as instruments, than when we use
the income deciles. This is likely to be due to how either set of instruments capture vari-
ation in the adoption of LPG. As with the previous set of estimations using NSS data, the
control variables have the expected signs. The first-stage results in Table B3 are intuitive,
and in line with what we observe for the NSS data, and the models exhibit consistently
high Cragg-Donald F-statistics and satisfy the overidentification tests. Given the exclusive
focus on rural areas of the ACCESS dataset, in even columns most of the variation in the
first stage is explained by the land ownership instrument, which, as expected, is associ-
ated with higher rates of LPG adoption. The combination of both instruments is, however,
crucial in allowing us to conduct overidentification tests.
We now turn to the IHDS data and to our panel specification. The relevant estimations
are provided in Table 7.10 Column 1 presents the results of the baseline model, where
we take advantage of the panel structure of the data and incorporate household and
10 The first-stage results of these estimations are provided in Table B4 in the Appendix.
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Table 6: ACCESS Estimation Results: Second Stage
Dep.Var.: Whether HH i uses LPG for cooking Income deciles Education (women) and land Income deciles Education (women) and land
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
Average LPG use rate (village/urban block) 0.285*** 0.598*** 0.400*** 0.670***
(0.078) (0.173) (0.160) (0.274)
Whether HH had access to electricity? 0.077*** 0.074*** 0.180*** 0.174***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.021) (0.022)
HH size -0.002*** -0.002** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of years of education of household head 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.074*** 0.074***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007)
Whether HH owns land? 0.035*** 0.043*** 0.093*** 0.100***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019)
Whether HH does not have access to supply of LPG? -0.454*** -0.449***
(0.013) (0.013)
Observations 8563 8563 3603 3603
First-stage Cragg Donald F-Stat 274.76 65.03 96.59 47.47
Hansen J-Statistic 2.76 1.95 2.22 0.49
P-Value 0.43 0.16 0.53 0.48
Notes: The proportion of population in the same village or urban block in the four highest income deciles are used as instruments in odd columns. Average
land ownership and the proportion of educated women in the same village or urban block are used as instruments in even columns. The Cragg-Donald F-
statistics are consistently high, and surpass the rule-of-thumb bound of 10 proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005) to identify weak instruments (first-stage results
are provided in Table B3 in the Appendix). All specifications include dummies for MPCEs, caste, religion and sub-districts. ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively denote
significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels. The coefficient of the constant has not been reported.
year fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. We find evidence consistent
with our previous estimations on the existence of social spillovers in LPG use. That is,
the results obtained from using panel data reinforce the picture provided by the cross
sections using NSS and ACCESS data. The results regarding the control variables and
the first stage are again as expected, including consistently high Cragg-Donald F-statistics
and estimates satisfying the overidentification tests. Recall that in our IHDS specifications
we use average land ownership in a village/urban block and the proportion of educated
women as instruments.
After having determined, using three different datasets, that social spillovers tend to
drive adoption of LPG, we focus on another feature of the IHDS data, which is that it
allows us to look at specific social networks, namely the ones described in the previous
section. In column 2 of Table 7, we estimate model (1) for all households who declare
that they do not belong to any of the social networks in our list. The endogenous variable,
thus, is the average level of LPG adoption among all other households in the same village,
or urban block, for this specification. In columns 3-9, we estimate separate models for
each of the social networks in our data. As with previous estimations, the variable of
interest is the average level of LPG adoption, for a given village, or urban block, but
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among the members of specific social networks. According to our hypothesis, the strength
of the spillovers may be higher among households belonging to social networks, given that
they are likely to experience deeper, and more persistent interactions among themselves.
However, some social networks may witness weaker spillovers, either due to especially
strong (or traditional) values, or limited information sharing on cooking fuels.
We find evidence to suggest that there may be strong social spillovers among house-
holds that belong to social networks. The magnitude of the coefficient for average LPG
adoption is 0.973 in column 2, the benchmark, and is significant at the 1% level. In
columns 3 to 9, we find most coefficients to be larger than the benchmark. House-
holds that belong to women’s associations, unions or business groups, religious and social
groups and development groups/NGOs are found to experience particularly strong social
spillover effects. It is reasonable to assume that members of these groups are likely to
facilitate knowledge sharing on new technologies, so that social networks may contribute
towards addressing some of the information asymmetry around the use of LPG. In con-
trast, and in line with our expectations, we find lower social spillovers, everything else
equal, for households who belong to youth or sports groups, where we can expect that
information exchange on cooking fuels may be weaker.
The results of columns (1) and (10) suggest that households with access to electricity,
and with heads that are more educated, are more likely to adopt LPG, whereas larger
households are less likely to do so. The corresponding first-stage results, as with the
results using ACCESS data, suggest that the average rate of LPG adoption is higher in
villages (or urban blocks) where households own larger plots of land, while controlling
for electricity access, ownership of land, and income in the second stage. Moreover, we
also find evidence to suggest that the average rate of LPG adoption is strongly correlated
with the proportion of households having highly educated (graduate level and above, or
those with technical education) women, which is as expected. Also with these specifica-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section, we provide the results of some robustness checks. We start with sensitivity
tests on the number of households per village/urban block. Our methodology relies on
survey data to identify social spillovers in the adoption of LPG in India. To this end,
we leverage the fact that household surveys in India tend to be very large. Even so,
since our analyses are done at the village/urban block level, for some geographical units,
the inference may rely on a relatively limited number of households. Hence, we run our
baseline estimation for the IHDS data, with different thresholds of households interviewed
per village. We use the following thresholds: 10, 20, and 30 households per village. These
thresholds are only applied to the IHDS data, as the sample size per village or urban block
is fixed for both the NSS and ACCESS data (at around 10 in case of the 43rd, 55th, and
61st rounds of the NSS, 8 in the 66th, and at 12 in the case of the ACCESS data.)
In columns 1-3 of Table B5 in the Appendix, we re-estimate the model of column 1 of
Table 7, i.e. the baseline model of the IHDS, using different restrictions for the sample size
per village.11 In column 1, we only include those observations for households residing in
village having at least 10 households, in column 2 at least 20 households, and in column
3 at least 30 households. We find that the results of column 1 in Table 7 are broadly
corroborated across different sample sizes. We further note that this conclusion would
also apply for the estimations using information about social networks.
We then proceed to additional robustness tests, leveraging the panel property of the
IHDS data. In Table B6 in the Appendix, columns 1 and 2, we estimate the panel IV-
LPM of column 1 of Table 7, but this time use village-specific fixed effects, and village-
by-year interactions, respectively. Village-specific, rather than individual-specific, fixed
effects capture time-invariant characteristics of the village (or urban block), which may
relate (for instance) to the supply of LPG. General trends may also interact with these
characteristics, hence the use of the village-by-year dummy variables in column (2). Table
11 The first-stage results of these estimations are provided in Table B8 in the Appendix.
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B6 shows that our main findings are robust to these additional specifications.
Another concern with the IHDS results may be that they are being influenced by mea-
surement error in variables that can be expected to not change significantly over time for
heads of households, such as income, education, religion or caste. Given that the two
periods of the sample are six years apart, it is, however, reasonable to expect income
and education to potentially vary between the two periods. India experienced significant
growth in the period 2005-2012. For instance, its GDP per capita increased from 31,746
Indian Rupees in 2005 to 78,729 Indian Rupees (at current prices) in 2012 (World Bank
Data, 2019). This corresponds to an increase of 148 %. In our dataset, household income
increased by about 130 % during this period, on average. Thus, the increase in household
income was concomitant with the increase in national income during this period. We also
expect education levels for households in our sample to have increased over time, given
that the age composition of households is relatively young, which is confirmed by our
data. Figure A5 in the Appendix, for instance, shows the age distribution of household
children in 2005. In 2005, the enrollment rates in schools and universities over all mem-
bers of the household was 56 % (including heads of household, their spouses, children
in-law, grandchildren, siblings, children as well as other relatives). Hence, it is reasonable
to expect that the education variable varies over the 2005-2011 period. However, other
variables, such as religion or caste, are less likely (or unlikely) to vary from one period to
another. Hence, in Table B7 in the Appendix we present the results of a sanity check to
ensure that the results of the IHDS data are not driven by measurement error in religion
or caste. Note that these variables vary over time for only 1.4 % of the households in
our dataset. Hence, unsurprisingly, our main results, originally presented in column 1 of
Table 7, are unaffected when we remove these households from our estimations. Note
that in this new estimation we can no longer control for caste or religion, as this variable






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.3 Discussion and Policy Implications
In this study, we find that there are positive social spillovers in the decision to use LPG be-
tween households residing in the same village or urban block. Our results rely on several
specifications and use both cross-sectional and panel data. We control for several factors
that have already been proved to be critical determinants of LPG use in the literature, and
we provide evidence suggesting that social interaction, in particular through membership
in specific social networks, may play an important role in facilitating the adoption of clean
cooking fuels.
In this section, we discuss the policy implications of our findings, especially from a
distributional perspective. The disparity in adoption between rural and urban areas is
of particular policy relevance. Social spillovers are very important in this respect. If it
were the case that social spillovers were stronger among urban households rather than
rural, and this difference would persist over time, policy-makers will find it increasingly
difficult to narrow the gap between rural and urban areas, without implementing specific
policies aiming at increasing adoption among rural households (such as leveraging social
spillovers there). On the other hand, if rural households experience stronger spillovers
(and continue to do so over time), it is not implausible to expect them to catch up to
urban households in terms of adoption levels. The question that would then arise is how
long catching up may take, i.e. how long will rural households still rely on fuels leading
to indoor pollution and other health issues while urban households enjoy better living
conditions. While performing this exercise, we also discuss about the observed dynamics
of spillovers over time.
To this end, we test for heterogeneity in the magnitude of the spillovers between rural
and urban households. To this end, we re-estimate our baseline model using the NSS data
for the rural and urban sub-samples: the results are presented in columns (1) to (8) of
Table 8.12 We find that in the 43rd round of the dataset, the magnitude of the coefficient
12 The corresponding first-stage results are provided in Table B9.
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was higher for urban households, than it was for rural households (as can be discerned
from columns 1 and 2). In moving from the results of column 1 towards column 8 of
this Table, we find that the magnitudes of spillovers decline for both rural and urban
households. However, importantly, it declines faster for the urban sub-sample, with the
difference in point estimates being statistically significant at the 5 % level. Note that in
the 66th round, we find that the spillovers are insignificant for the urban sample (column
8).13
Hence, our historical analysis provides evidence suggesting that the strength of social
spillovers has decreased over time, but at a slower pace for urban areas than for rural
areas. That is, while social spillovers in urban areas were already negligible at the time of
the last wave of the NSS data, they were still relatively strong in rural areas. This analysis,
combined with our findings from the ACCESS data, which we recall focuses exclusively
on rural areas, suggests that social spillovers in rural areas have still been at play over
the last decade or so and have contributed to narrowing the gap between rural and urban
households in terms of LPG adoption levels, with respect to a counterfactual without social
spillovers. However, referring back to Figures A2 and A3, we note that the gap in adoption
between rural and urban households has not decreased over time. If anything, it appears
to have increased. The more recent ACCESS data confirm that, in 2015, only 22 % of
rural households used LPG in the six states covered by its survey. Hence, we conclude
that the effect of social spillovers has been dominated by other forces, more conducive
to adoption in urban areas. Whether in future years social spillovers may be sufficiently
strong to correct the current trend may largely depend on whether their potential is fully
exploited by policymakers and practitioners.
While access, affordability and availability remain critical to ensure sustained adop-
tion, our findings suggest that there may be other means to expedite adoption. Addition-
13 These estimates are not directly comparable to those in the baseline estimation results of Table 5, which
include a dummy variable for rural households as a control. On dropping this dummy variable from the
estimations in Table 5, the results of both tables are directly comparable, and the size of the average
effects in Table 5 lie between the estimates for the rural and urban sub-samples obtained from Table 8.
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ally, the role of social networks, as documented in this paper, and in particular of women’s
groups, development groups, and agricultural cooperatives, in facilitating LPG adoption
by households, clearly indicates the way for policymakers and practitioners to start lever-
aging social spillovers. Leveraging social networks has been shown, theoretically, to be
a much more cost-effective way to lead to normative behavior when designing interven-
tions compared to policies that neglect the network structure of society (Spencer et al.,
2019). Such interventions could be tested with randomized controlled trials, in presence
and absence of complementary measures such as subsidies.
5 Conclusion
Greater adoption of clean cooking fuels such as LPG by the Indian population is vital for
achieving a sustained reduction in indoor air pollution, thus ensuring the consequent im-
provement of respiratory health. This paper analyses whether there are social spillovers in
the adoption of LPG in India, and whether these effects are stronger among households in
social networks. We use three sources of data spanning a widely heterogenous population
and several decades, which enable us to provide a broad scope in addressing this research
question. We provide multiple pieces of evidence suggesting that social spillovers are
present in the adoption of LPG in India, and that social networks play an important role
in the dissemination of information across households. We use both cross-sectional and
panel data, and control for several household-level characteristics of LPG adoption that
have been shown to be important determinants in the literature, while adopting multiple
identification strategies to tackle potential endogeneity. Our results point to an impor-
tant, and most likely largely untapped potential of social networks to spread information
about LPG among Indian households. Our historical perspective also informs policymak-
ers and practitioners elsewhere in the developing world, looking to encourage consumers
to switch to cleaner sources of energy in contexts similar to urban India a few decades
ago, or to rural India in more recent times. Following our results, we consider that in-
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terventions leveraging social spillovers should be part of the battery of instruments used
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Figure A3: Population Share (%) Using LPG as the Primary Cooking Fuel: Thick Rounds
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Figure A4: Share of Households Using LPG as the Primary Cooking Fuel (By State)
(Source: NSS)
(a) 1987-88 (b) 1999-2000
(c) 2004-05 (d) 2009-10
Notes: The maps show the proportion of households (by state) for whom LPG was the
primary cooking fuel in the 43rd, 55th, 61st, and the 66th rounds of the NSS.
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Appendix B Tables
Table B1: NSS Estimation Results: Linear Probability Model
Round 43 55 61 66
Year 1987-88 1999-00 2004-05 2009-10
Dep.Var.: Whether prim. cooking fuel of HH i is LPG (1) (2) (3) (4)
Average LPG use rate (village/urban block) 0.619*** 0.468*** 0.353*** 0.341***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Whether bordering an urban center? -0.053*** -0.051 -0.131*** -0.025
(0.013) (0.065) (0.060) (0.045)
Whether HH had access to electricity? 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.035*** 0.037***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Whether HH lives in a rural area? 0.011*** -0.007 -0.011*** -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Whether HH purchased a cookstove in last 30/365 days? -0.033*** -0.107*** -0.021 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.022) (0.017)
HH size 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.019***
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Age of head of HH 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0008*** 0.0008***
(0.00007) (0.00009) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Whether head of HH is female? 0.006*** 0.021*** 0.013*** 0.011***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Whether head of HH is educated? 0.041*** 0.089*** 0.083*** 0.100***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Price of LPG -0.00003 -0.010*** -0.0004** -0.004***
(0.0005) (0.002) (0.0002) (0.001)
Price of kerosene 0.004*** 0.00004 -0.00001** 0.003
(0.001) (0.00009) (0.000006) (0.002)
Whether HH had access to firewood? -0.134*** -0.229*** -0.396*** -0.435***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 104845 102994 97963 67374
R-squared 0.4729 0.5775 0.6004 0.6381
Notes: All specifications include dummy variables for districts, MPCE deciles, religion and cast. Standard errors are
clustered at the village/urban block level (reported in parentheses). ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively denote significance at
10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels. The coefficient of the constant has not been reported.
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Table B2: NSS Estimation Results: First Stage
Round 43 55 61 66
Year 1987-88 1999-00 2004-05 2009-10
Dep.Var.: Whether prim. cooking fuel of HH i is LPG (1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion of households in 7th income decile -0.015 0.04 -0.014 0.187***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.028) (0.039)
Proportion of households in 8th income decile 0.056** 0.277*** 0.264*** 0.280***
(0.029) (0.041) (0.035) (0.044)
Proportion of households in 9th income decile 0.186*** 0.514*** 0.465*** 0.388***
(0.032) (0.040) (0.032) (0.031)
Proportion of households in 10th income decile 0.507*** 0.549*** 0.435*** 0.312***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Whether bordering an urban center? -0.112*** 0.021*** -0.019 0.056
(0.022) (0.004) (0.066) (0.058)
Whether HH had access to electricity? 0.030*** 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.052***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Whether HH lives in a rural area? -0.129*** -0.260*** -0.284*** -0.298***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Whether HH purchased a cookstove in last 30/365 days? -0.001 -0.026*** 0.006 0.039***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.017)
HH size 0.001*** 0.002*** -0.001** -0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Age of head of HH 0.0009*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0004***
(0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.0001)
Whether head of HH is female? 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Whether head of HH is educated? 0.027*** 0.036*** 0.023*** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Price of LPG -0.0003 -0.005*** 0.00002 -0.002**
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.00007) (0.0009)
Price of kerosene -0.006*** 0.0001 0.000005 -0.002
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.000003) (0.002)
Whether HH had access to firewood? -0.083*** -0.107*** -0.131*** -0.173***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 104845 102994 97963 67374
Notes: All specifications include dummy variables for districts, MPCE deciles, religion and cast. Standard errors are
clustered at the village/urban block level (reported in parentheses). ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively denote significance at
10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels. The coefficient of the constant has not been reported.
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Table B3: ACCESS Estimation Results: First Stage
Dep.Var.: Whether HH i uses LPG for cooking Income deciles Education (women) and land Income decile Education (women) and land
Column (1) (2) (3) (4)
Proportion of households in 7th income decile 0.085 0.042
(0.066) (0.091)
Proportion of households in 8th income decile -0.049 0.04
(0.095) (0.108)
Proportion of households in 9th income decile 0.377*** 0.365***
(0.075) (0.082)
Proportion of households in 10th income decile 0.563*** 0.546***
(0.093) (0.117)
Proportion of households with educated women 0.251 -0.127
(0.268) (0.281)
Average size of land holdings 0.003*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002)
Whether HH had access to electricity? 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
HH size -0.0001 -0.0003 0.001** 0.0006
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Number of years of education of HH head 0.002** 0.003*** 0.0004 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Whether HH owns land? -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.033***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Whether LPG is unavailable? -0.013*** -0.017***
(0.005) (0.006)
Observations 8563 8563 3603 3603
Notes: All specifications include income decile, sub-district, religion and caste dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the village/urban block level




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B5: Robustness Checks: Sample Size Thresholds (Second Stage IHDS)
Column (1) (2) (3)
Average LPG use rate (village/urban block) 0.946*** 0.942*** 0.943***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Whether HH lives in a rural area? 0.007 0.006 0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012)
Whether HH had access to electricity? 0.110*** 0.104*** 0.088***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
HH size -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of years of education of HH head 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.001)
Whether HH owns land? 0.006 0.005 -0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 38240 28744 15534
First-stage Cragg Donald F-Stat 3148.208 2806.732 2188.269
Hansen J-Statistic 0.007 0.015 0.409
P-Value 0.9317 0.9022 0.5225
Notes: Average land ownership and the proportion of educated women in the
same village or urban block are used as instruments. The Cragg-Donald F-statistics
are consistently high, and surpass the rule-of-thumb bound of 10 proposed by
Stock and Yogo (2005) to identify weak instruments (first-stage results are pro-
vided in columns (1) to (3) of Table B8). All specifications include household-level
and year fixed effects. All specifications include dummies for income deciles, and
controls for caste and religion. ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively denote significance at 10
%, 5 % and 1 % levels. The coefficient of the constant has not been reported.
53
Table B6: Robustness Checks: Different Model Specifications (Second Stage IHDS)
Column (1) (2)
Average LPG use rate (village/urban block) 0.895*** 0.902***
(0.007) (0.008)
Whether HH had access to electricity? 0.141*** 0.136***
(0.014) (0.010)
HH size -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.0007) (0.0004)
Number of years of education of HH head 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.0004) (0.0003)
Whether HH owns land? 0.022*** 0.020***
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 43179 43179
First-stage Cragg Donald F-Stat 6535.421 5612.617
Hansen J-Statistic 8.148 0.206
P-Value 0.0043 0.6502
Notes: Average land ownership and the proportion of educated
women in the same village or urban block are used as instruments.
The Cragg-Donald F-statistics are consistently high, and surpass the
rule-of-thumb bound of 10 proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005) to iden-
tify weak instruments (first-stage results are provided in columns (4)
and (5) of Table B8). Both specifications include household-level and
year fixed effects, as well as dummies for income deciles, and controls
for caste and religion. ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively denote significance at
10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels. The coefficient of the constant has not been
reported.
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Table B7: Robustness Checks: Accounting for Measurement Error (Second Stage IHDS)
Column (1)
Average LPG use rate (village/urban block) 0.945***
(0.010)
Whether HH lives in a rural area? 0.010
(0.013)




Number of years of education of HH head 0.002***
(0.001)
Whether HH owns land? 0.006
(0.005)
Observations 40008
First-stage Cragg Donald F-Stat 3137.579
Hansen J-Statistic 0
P-Value 0.9825
Notes: Average land ownership and the proportion of ed-
ucated women in the same village or urban block are used
as instruments. The Cragg-Donald F-statistics are consis-
tently high, and surpass the rule-of-thumb bound of 10
proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005) to identify weak in-
struments (first-stage results are provided in column (6)
of Table B8). The specification includes household-level
and year fixed effects, and dummies for income deciles,
and controls for caste and religion. ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respec-
tively denote significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % levels.
The coefficient of the constant has not been reported.
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Table B8: Robustness Checks: First Stage
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Proportion of households with educated women 0.173*** 0.191*** 0.242*** 0.147*** 0.140*** 0.141***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
Average size of land holdings 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0007*** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.00003) (0.00003)
Whether HH lives in a rural area? 0.082** 0.103** 0.186*** 0.033 0.013*** 0.013***
(0.038) (0.047) (0.060) (0.038) (0.004) (0.004)
Whether HH had access to electricity? 0.513*** 0.501*** 0.451*** 0.417*** 0.422*** 0.423***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.024) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
HH size -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Number of years of education of household head -0.002 -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Whether HH owns land? -0.018* -0.020*** -0.032*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 38240 28744 15534 43179 43179 40008
Notes: Average land ownership and the proportion of educated women in the same village or urban block are used as instruments. All
specifications include dummy variables for income deciles, religion and caste as well as household and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the village/urban block level (reported in parentheses). ∗,∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively denote significance at 10 %, 5 % and
1 % levels. The coefficient of the constant has not been reported.
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